Model Context Protocol bridge for WOMBATpass with OIDC pass-through auth.
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# Wombat MCP Bridge <img src="https://www.wombat-gov.dev/images/WAFpp_upscaled_1000.png" width="120" alt="Wombat logo" align="right"> A secure [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server that exposes Wombat (Wombat backend) REST endpoints as MCP tools for AI assistants. ## Architecture ```mermaid sequenceDiagram actor User participant AI_Client as AI Client (MCP Host) participant MCP as wombat-mcp (this bridge) participant IdP as Keycloak / IdP participant API as wombat-server User->>IdP: Authenticate (OIDC/SAML) IdP-->>User: IdP tokens User->>API: Exchange IdP tokens for Wombat JWT API-->>User: Wombat access token User->>AI_Client: Start AI session AI_Client->>MCP: SSE /sse with Authorization: Bearer <Wombat token> MCP->>API: Introspect token (GET /auth/me) or verify HS256 locally API-->>MCP: User profile {id, username, role, is_active} alt Token invalid MCP-->>AI_Client: 401 Unauthorized else Token valid AI_Client->>MCP: tools/list MCP-->>AI_Client: Tools filtered by user's role AI_Client->>MCP: tools/call (e.g. list runs) MCP->>MCP: Validate arguments against OpenAPI schema MCP->>API: Proxy request with same Bearer token API-->>MCP: Backend response (row-level auth applied) MCP-->>AI_Client: MCP TextContent(result) end ``` ## Security model - **IdP-agnostic**: The bridge does not talk to Keycloak/Entra/Okta directly. It trusts tokens issued by the upstream `wombat-server`, which handles the actual OIDC/SAML flows. - **OIDC pass-through**: The AI client inherits the user's Wombat SSO context by presenting the same Bearer token. - **Least privilege**: `tools/list` is filtered by the authenticated user's role. Unauthorized tools are invisible. - **Context propagation**: Every backend call forwards the original `Authorization: Bearer` header so Wombat can apply endpoint- and row-level authorization. When a cal…
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