Resend transactional email MCP server — send, manage contacts, broadcasts, domains, webhooks
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# Resend Blade MCP Security-first MCP server for [Resend](https://resend.com) transactional email — send, manage contacts, broadcasts, templates, domains, and webhooks with programmatic safety controls. Built on [FastMCP 2.0](https://github.com/jlowin/fastmcp) and [httpx](https://www.python-httpx.org/). Designed for agentic workflows where LLMs operate autonomously. ## Why not the official Resend MCP? The [official resend-mcp](https://github.com/resend/resend-mcp) covers the full API but was designed for human-supervised chat, not autonomous agents. In agentic contexts, its security model breaks down: | Capability | resend-blade-mcp | Official resend-mcp | Generic vendor MCPs | |---|---|---|---| | **Write gating** | Programmatic env var gate | Prompt engineering only | Usually none | | **Filesystem access** | **None** — base64/URL only | `filePath` reads any file | Varies | | **API key management** | **Excluded entirely** | Full CRUD exposed to agent | Often exposed | | **Credential scrubbing** | All error paths scrubbed | Not implemented | Rarely | | **Tool count** | 28 focused | 60+ (context window bloat) | Varies | | **Output format** | Pipe-delimited, null omission | Raw JSON responses | Raw JSON | | **HTTP transport auth** | Built-in bearer middleware | Per-session key only | Rarely | | **Idempotency** | Native `Idempotency-Key` header | Not exposed as parameter | Rarely | | **Rate limit handling** | Typed `RateLimitError` with retry-after | Raw error passthrough | Varies | ### The filesystem problem The official MCP accepts `filePath` in attachments, calling `fs.readFile()` with no path validation. An autonomous agent could read `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, or any file on the host and attach it to an email sent to any address. **resend-blade-mcp** rejects all filesystem paths — only base64 content and HTTPS URLs are permitted. ### The API key problem The official MCP exposes `create-api-key` and `remove-api-key` tools. An agent could create a full…
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