Runtime integrity and anomaly detection for MCP servers using OpenTelemetry and SigNoz.
Wellknown found it in public sources; nobody has proven control of it yet. Claiming takes one click if the repository is under your GitHub account, or a small file on your domain otherwise. Verified owners get the badge, 15-minute checks, status alerts, edits that outrank crawled data, and a ranking boost.
Agents can do it too: POST https://wellknown.network/api/v1/claims with {"agent":"mcp-sentinel-proxy","method":"well_known_file"} — machine-readable steps at claim.json, guide at /docs/claim.
Everything here was measured by our prober or read from a registry. Nothing is self-reported.
Attributed to the source that supplied each field. Treated as claims, not facts.
<div align="center"> <img src="docs/assets/banner.svg" alt="Sentinel" width="100%" />     </div> **Sentinel is a transparent security proxy for MCP.** Point your MCP client at Sentinel instead of at the server, and every JSON-RPC message passes through byte-for-byte unchanged while four local engines score it for rug pulls, exfiltration chains, and novel abuse, and ship redacted OpenTelemetry to a SigNoz you host yourself. Install the CLI once, globally. One command, no service to run: ```bash pipx install mcp-sentinel-proxy ``` Now watch it catch two real attacks in about eight seconds. No Docker, no SigNoz, no config, no checkout. The demo server ships inside the package, so this runs straight off the install: ```bash sentinel demo ``` ``` sentinel local demo 6 passed ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ok sentinel health http://127.0.0.1:9000/healthz reports ok - 'quickstart-demo' over http ok demo server health http://127.0.0.1:9100/healthz reports ok - 'demo-http-server' ok tools/list passthrough forecast_report, read_secret, send_webhook, weather_current ok normal tool call Reykjavik: 26C, partly cloudy ok strict mode blocks rug pull Blocked MCP tool schema drift in Sentinel strict mode. ok strict mode blocks read-to-egress chain Blocked risky MCP tool sequence in Sentinel strict mode. strict - a detected finding blocks the call ``` That is a real proxy in front of a real MCP server, blocking two real attacks in about eight seconds. (Ports are picked fre…
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