Local runtime security scanner for MCP servers — known-CVE checks, one-click fixes
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# mcp-audit A local runtime security scanner for MCP servers. Point it at your MCP client configs and it flags the misconfigurations and known vulnerabilities that actually get exploited — then offers one-click fixes. Zero third-party dependencies, Python >= 3.9. ```bash pip install mcp-runtime-audit mcp-audit scan ``` ## Why this exists MCP servers run with your user's privileges and are driven by an AI agent on your behalf — which makes them a very different threat surface from a library you import. The evidence so far is not reassuring: - **The official tooling itself has shipped RCE.** CVE-2025-49596 hit Anthropic's MCP Inspector (CVSS 9.4): its local proxy accepted an unauthenticated `/sse` request with `transportType=stdio&command=<cmd>` and spawned it as a subprocess — visiting a malicious page was enough to run code on the developer's machine. Fixed in Inspector 0.14.1. - **Enterprise MCP apps are not immune.** CVE-2026-76404 (Splunk MCP Server < 1.2.1, CVSS 9.1): unsafe deserialization in credential management let an admin-role user execute arbitrary OS commands (Splunk advisory SVD-2026-0808). - **Anthropic treats stdio risk as "expected"** — the position is that the security burden sits with whoever deploys the server, not the protocol. That leaves every local config file as the real security boundary, and those files are hand-edited JSON. - **Unpatched servers are out there in production.** Five US federal government MCP servers were found running unpatched, and internet-wide scans keep turning up thousands of exposed MCP endpoints, the vast majority without any authentication. Nobody audits their own `~/.claude.json` by hand. mcp-audit does it in a second, in CI-friendly form. ## How it differs | Tool | Known-CVE version checks | One-click fixes | Focus | |------|--------------------------|-----------------|-------| | **mcp-audit** | ✅ bundled CVE table | ✅ `fix --apply` | runtime security | | mcpscan | ❌ | ❌ | static …
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