AIShield Security Scanner

Name: AIShield Security Scanner
Author: AIShield Project

AgentA2A

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Evidence

Everything here was measured by our prober or read from a registry. Nothing is self-reported.

30-day availability113/113 checks ok

Endpoints

https://aishield.tools/api/v1/mcpa2a · auth: none · checked on a schedule

Registry facts

Not distributed through a package registry we index.

when	check	result	http	latency	detail
55 min ago	a2a card	ok	200	627 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
7 h ago	a2a card	ok	200	612 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
14 h ago	a2a card	ok	200	1022 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
20 h ago	a2a card	ok	200	599 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
27 h ago	a2a card	ok	200	1232 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
34 h ago	a2a card	ok	200	640 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
2 d ago	a2a card	ok	200	824 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
2 d ago	a2a card	ok	200	638 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
2 d ago	a2a card	ok	200	684 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills
3 d ago	a2a card	ok	200	1922 ms	protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills

Declared by sources

What the publisher says

Attributed to the source that supplied each field. Treated as claims, not facts.

Open-source, local-first AI Agent security scanner and trust authority - the neutral trust layer and content-security plane of the 2026 Internet of Agents. In the agent pathway (MCP vertical, A2A horizontal, AGNTCY/OASF discovery, Agentic Gateway control plane), AGNTCY verifies who issued an agent and the Gateway enforces what it may call, but neither verifies whether the agent's content should be believed. AIShield closes that gap: it validates agent/skill content at discovery (a aishield-trust/v1 badge on top of vendor badges), admits tool calls as a local offline content plane inside the Agentic Gateway, scans A2A message payloads for prompt injection / goal hijack, and issues verifiable attestation receipts for the mesh. Scans MCP servers, AI skills and agents for tool poisoning, prompt injection, secret leakage, sandbox misconfiguration and supply-chain risk; covers OWASP MCP Top 10, OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI01-ASI10) and sandbox-escape hardening. Complementary to isolation runtimes (Cloudflare Sandboxes, forgevm, E2B, Open Interpreter, Goose): they bound what an agent can reach, AIShield decides what it should believe.

securityauditmcpagentagenticowaspsupply-chainslopsquattingtyposquatsbomofflineconfigdiscoverystatic-analysisnamespace-shadowingtoxic-flowlocal-firstagent-computersandboxpreflightworkspacecloudflare-sandboxforgevmgooseopen-interpreterattestationcertificationrug-pullmonitoringtrustregistryscoreidentitynhiagent-cardscope-attenuationmtlsdida2anetwork

Declared skills

Security Scan — Scan an MCP server, AI skill or agent description against 264 MCP / 291 skill rule categories (OWASP MCP Top 10 + Agentic AI Top 10 + sandbox hardening). For skill assets, Markdown is treated as executable payload rather than documentation.
Agentic AI Audit — Audit an AI agent against OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI01-ASI10): goal hijack, tool misuse, identity abuse, supply chain, code execution, memory poisoning, inter-agent comms, cascading failure, human-agent trust, rogue agents.
Supply Chain & Hallucinated Package Audit — Offline detection of slopsquatting / AI-hallucinated dependencies in package.json, requirements.txt and pyproject.toml. Covers typosquat (Levenshtein), homoglyph poisoning, brand impersonation, composite hallucination (the ~50% of fabricated names that are NOT edit-distance-similar to any real package, e.g. react-codeshift), cross-registry confusion, dependency confusion, install-script poisoning, untrusted sources, unpinned versions and missing lockfiles. Zero network calls, zero package datab…
Multi-Client MCP Config Discovery & Audit — Auto-discover MCP server configurations across 14 client surfaces (Claude Desktop, Claude Code user+project, Cursor user+project, VS Code user+project, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot CLI, Augment, Zed, Cline, WorkBuddy) and statically audit them for privileged launch, runtime package fetch at startup, shell-interpreter invocation, non-registry provenance, inline plaintext credentials, insecure transport, wildcard bind, unauthenticated remote endpoints, project-level trust traps, namespace…
Agent Computer Pre-Flight Scan — Scan an agent workspace BEFORE the sandbox boots. Parses .mcp.json, forge / agent-forge, Goose and Open Interpreter configurations plus every skill file, scores each item, and returns a boot / review / refuse verdict. Complements isolation runtimes (Cloudflare Sandboxes and Containers, forgevm, E2B, Open Interpreter, Goose) which bound blast radius but do not inspect the content an agent loads inside the box. Also checks 11 sandbox-hardening rules on the box definition itself: mounted docker.so…
Continuous Attestation — Subscribe an MCP server, skill or live agent workspace to recurring re-scanning (default 7-day cycle). Detects drift against the recorded evidence hash, revokes certification when the score drops below threshold, and exposes a machine-readable answer to 'is this still trustworthy right now'. Designed for rug-pull defence: certification without expiry is marketing.
Trust Score Lookup

kind A2A Agent Card

name A2A Agent Card

summary A2A Agent Card

version A2A Agent Card

description A2A Agent Card

homepageUrl A2A Agent Card

publisherUrl A2A Agent Card

publisherName A2A Agent Card

Provenance

Where this record came from

Every source is kept verbatim. Field changes are logged as events.

A2A Agent Cardhttps://aishield.tools/.well-known/agent-card.json

first seen 2 mo ago · fetched 6 d agoopen ↗

Field history (8 recent events)

20 d ago · declared · version → "4.11.0"
2 mo ago · declared · description → "Open-source, local-first AI Agent security scanner and trust authority - the neutral trust layer and content-security p
2 mo ago · declared · publisherName → "AIShield Project"
2 mo ago · declared · publisherUrl → "https://aishield.tools"
2 mo ago · declared · summary → "Open-source, local-first AI Agent security scanner and trust authority - the neutral trust layer and content-security p
2 mo ago · declared · version → "4.3.0"
2 mo ago · declared · protocols → ["a2a"]
2 mo ago · declared · homepageUrl → "https://aishield.tools"

— Return an agent's AIShield Trust Score (0-100) and certification level from the Agent Registry.

Agent Identity & Credential Scan — Scan the agent identity layer (NHI). Verifies AgentCard / agent-identity declarations are signed (JWS/DID/proof), credentials are short-lived rather than never-expiring, authorization is least-privilege (flags scope:'*' and over-broad grants that violate scope attenuation), and mTLS/DID verification is present. This is the fastest-moving front of 2026 agent security (the top A2A issues are all identity; Authentik's NHI wave; ANS/DNSid/Entra Agent ID). AIShield both issues trust certificates AND…

Agent Network / Mesh Config Scan — Scan the agent network layer. Flags Cloudflare Mesh / VPC bindings that expose the whole account network to every agent (the gap Cloudflare itself admits: 'per-agent identity and policy evaluation are future work'), unauthenticated agent endpoints (auth: none), bind-to-all-interfaces exposure (0.0.0.0), and private/internal resources marked public:true. Answers the 'trust shallow' problem left open by A2A's signed AgentCard: content trust + identity attribution + network reachability.

Attack Replay & Regression Detection — Snapshot and replay past attack payloads against the current rule set. Detects rule-regression: a payload that was previously blocked but is now allowed because rules were weakened or a pattern was missed. Each snapshot stores payload hash + verdict + evidence, enabling 'has our defense regressed since last check' audits. Borrowed from the ChronosFix 'fault time machine' pattern in agent infra competitions.

Vertical-Domain Semantic Risk Scan — Domain-specific semantic risk screening for high-sensitivity verticals: finance (fraud inducement / unlicensed wealth management / pump-and-dump), medical (unlicensed diagnosis / false cure claims), and government/public-sector (sensitive topics / unauthorized disclosure). Sits on top of the generic OWASP rule set to catch agent output that is technically compliant but semantically dangerous in its context. Borrowed from the FinFlux 'financial semantic admission' pattern.

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Evidence

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Capabilities

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