Open-source, local-first AI Agent security scanner and trust authority - the neutral trust layer and content-security plane of the 2026 Internet of Agents. In the agent pathway (MCP vertical, A2A horizontal, AGNTCY/OASF discovery, Agentic Gateway control plane), AGNTCY verifies who issued an agent …
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| when | check | result | http | latency | detail |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 h ago | a2a card | ok | 200 | 617 ms | protocol 0.3.0 · card: AIShield Security Scanner · 11 skills |
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Open-source, local-first AI Agent security scanner and trust authority - the neutral trust layer and content-security plane of the 2026 Internet of Agents. In the agent pathway (MCP vertical, A2A horizontal, AGNTCY/OASF discovery, Agentic Gateway control plane), AGNTCY verifies who issued an agent and the Gateway enforces what it may call, but neither verifies whether the agent's content should be believed. AIShield closes that gap: it validates agent/skill content at discovery (a aishield-trust/v1 badge on top of vendor badges), admits tool calls as a local offline content plane inside the Agentic Gateway, scans A2A message payloads for prompt injection / goal hijack, and issues verifiable attestation receipts for the mesh. Scans MCP servers, AI skills and agents for tool poisoning, prompt injection, secret leakage, sandbox misconfiguration and supply-chain risk; covers OWASP MCP Top 10, OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 (ASI01-ASI10) and sandbox-escape hardening. Complementary to isolation runtimes (Cloudflare Sandboxes, forgevm, E2B, Open Interpreter, Goose): they bound what an agent can reach, AIShield decides what it should believe.
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